Requires the advice and consent of the city council for the appointment of judges by the Mayor of the city of New York

◆ The sponsor's argument

Why Luis R. Sepúlveda says this is needed

The judiciary of New York State is vast, hearing millions of cases every year. There are more than 3,000 judges in New York, who all share the immense responsibility of interpreting our laws with diligence and impartiality. Public buy-in is an essential part of this process. As put by the American Bar Association "The ability of courts to serve their purpose in a constitutional republic turns on the public's acceptance and support. Without it, an otherwise sound judiciary cannot long endure" (Justice in Jeopardy, (2003)). Chronologically, the selection process is the first step in building the judiciary, and with that, it is the first step towards building public trust in the judiciary. In New York, judges typically ascend the bench by election or executive appointment. For appointment-based positions, candidates typically undergo an approval process known as "advice and consent". During this process, the legislature vets the appointee's qualcations and addresses any potential concerns before ultimately voting to approve or deny the appointment. This function serves as a vital check on executive power, shielding the judicial appointment process from political favors or patronage. However, in New York City, a significant exception exists that bypasses this safeguard altogether. Judges serving in New York City's Family and Criminal courts, as well as interim Civil Court appointees, are selected solely by the mayor, from a pool of candidates put forth by the Mayoral Advisory Committee on the Judiciary ("MACJ"). Despite being responsible for nearly one-third of the city's judicial appointments, this process operates without any meaningful input from the public or the City Council. The MACJ was first established by Mayor Ed Koch via Executive Order in 1978. Since then, each Mayor has introduced an executive order adopting some version of this foundational structure. While its primary role is to screen and recommend candidates to the mayor, little else is known about the committee or its processes. It does not publicly disclose its evaluation criteria, and historically, its members have been disinclined to comment on the committee's decision-making. While the MACJ has been criticized for a lack of transparency, propo- nents of the underlying structure argue that the system fosters a merit-based, non-partisan selection, unlike judicial elections which often require candidates to seek partisan backing. It was this exact conflict that led New York to amend its state constitution in 1978, reforming judicial appointment to our state's highest court, the Court of Appeals. Following a series of tumultuous, highly partisan election cycles in the 1970's, the state recognized that the current system conflicted with the need for independent, non-partisan judges on the bench. The solution was a constitutional amendment which introduced a merit-based system: Candi- dates were now vetted by a Judicial Selection Committee, nominated by the Governor, and approved by the Senate. By adopting this same frame- work for its highest courts, New York affirmed the importance of sepa- ration of powers. While the MACJ mirrors the selection function of the state's Judicial Selection Committee, approval by the legislature is absent from the mayor's appointment process. Without this legislative check, the city's judicial selection process lacks a vital mechanism for ensuring judicial independence and public trust. The principle of "Advice and Consent" dates back to the founding of our country and embeds the core pillars of our democracy firmly within the appointment process. The Framers viewed this mechanism as an essential check on executive power. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 76, argued that the necessity of legislative concurrence, would serve as "an excellent check upon the spirit of favoritism in the president", preventing the appointment of "unfit characters" driven by state preju- dice, family connection, or personal ties. (Federalist No. 76). T

This is the sponsor's own case for the bill, quoted from their memorandum. It is not Agora's description of what the bill does.