Relates to strengthening of utility storm response and compliance

• Democratic10

◆ The sponsor's argument

Why Shelley Mayer says this is needed

Following utility service outages in several recent storms such as Quinn, Riley, and Isaias, the Public Service Commission (PSC) conducted inquiries into the emergency response performance of a number of utili- ties. While the PSC found violations and assessed penalties, it cited statutory limitations on the penalties it could impose as a factor in its determination as to the size of those penalties. Notwithstanding the alleged (and in some cases, admitted) violations with respect to an inadequate emergency response plan in connection with storms Quinn and Riley, customers experienced sustained outages and insufficient communications following Tropical Storm Isaias just over two years later. This suggests that penalties are insufficient to incen- tivize a change in behavior, and that utilities appear to view current statutory penalties as simply a cost of doing business. A pattern of major outages, poor planning, poor communication, and poor customer service are unacceptable at any time, but the failures of utilities in the wake of Tropical Storm Isaias were particularly hard on customers because the COVID-19 pandemic forced many people to work remotely and otherwise avoid leaving home. This situation predictably magnified the consequences of sustained outages on customers, including threats to health and safety, yet utilities did not calibrate their emergency response accordingly. This bill addresses the inadequate incentives for utilities to improve by achieving two goals: (1) enhanced capacity for the PSC to impose penalties significant enough to be a true deterrent to future violations; and (2) expansion of emergency response plan requirements to ensure that utilities devote more resources to proper planning. The penalty provisions of this bill are significant. Eliminating the statu- tory limits on penalties will mean greatly increased liability for util- ities in the event of violations, thereby better incentivizing compli- ance. By requiring the PSC to assess penalties based on an enumerated set of factors, this approach also allows for the imposition of penal- ties that are proportionate to the violations in question. Further, utilities have in the past argued broadly against the need to assume responsibility for poor performance by pointing to "reasonable" compli- ance with the law. To foreclose arguments about whether a utility "reasonably" complied, and to hold utilities to account for poor performance, the bill removes the "reasonably" qualifier. Finally, these stronger penalty provisions are extended to cover utilities other than combination gas and electric corporations. In a similar vein, this bill extends emergency response plan require- ments to telephone and cable television companies. Emergency response plans (ERPs) detail, inter alia, how a utility plans to restore service, communicate with the public and government officials regarding service interruptions, and ensure a safe and efficient response overall. Currently, only electric corporations are statutorily required to prepare ERPs with a high level of detail and to make them publicly available, thus limiting PSC oversight of other utilities. Expanding the scope of ERP requirements to include telephone companies and cable companies (which provide valuable communication and information dissem- ination services during storms and other major events) will provide for greater accountability to the public, in no small part because it allows the PSC to assess penalties for failure to adhere to ERPs.

This is the sponsor's own case for the bill, quoted from their memorandum. It is not Agora's description of what the bill does.