Relates to the time-limit for appeals in all categories of family court cases

◆ The sponsor's argument

Why Roxanne J. Persaud says this is needed

This bill adds clarity to the law by providing needed time limits for filing notices of appeal in all Family Court case categories and for the filing of objections to Support Magistrate determinations, and provides a more objective, reasonable deadline for rulings on child support objections by Family Court judges. During the pandemic and continuing to the present day, Family Courts have been sending orders in all categories of cases electronically when- ever the Courts have email addresses for parties and/or their attorneys. Electronic transmission of documents has further increased with the rapidly expanding implementation of electronic filing programs in Family Courts in New York City and several counties upstate. However, in two recent cases the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that the court's service of orders by email, rather than in court or by mail, did not start the time period within which a notice of appeal must be filed. See Matter of Bukowski v. Florentino, 176 A.D.3d 812 (4th Dept., 2022); Matter of Grayson S. (Thomas S.), 209 A.D.3d 1309 (4th Dept., 2022). In Matter of Grayson S., the Fourth Department reasoned: Inasmuch as the father was served the order by the court via email, which is not a method provided for in Family Court Act 1113, and there is no indication that he was served by any of the methods authorized by the statute, we conclude that the time to take an appeal did not begin to run and that it cannot be said that the father's appeal is untimely (see Batts, 198 AD3d at 751; Matter of Tynell S., 43 AD3d 1171, 1172 (2d Dept 2007)). This bill would remedy that gap by providing that the electronic trans- mission of an order, like the mailing of an order, triggers a 35-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal. The bill would also add a reference to electronic transmission to the notice regarding the time limit for taking an appeal that is required to appear on all orders. A similar gap exists in Family Court Act § 439(e) with respect to the time limit for the filing of objections to Support Magistrate rulings in child support, paternity and parentage proceedings. Recognizing the importance of giving clear guidance regarding applicable deadlines in Family Court proceedings, especially in light of the large percentage of litigants without attorneys, this bill would provide that the electronic transmission of an order, like the mailing of an order, triggers a 35-day time limit for the filing of objections. As the United States Supreme Court held in Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011), procedures in civil child support proceedings must satisfy the precept of "funda- mental fairness," a precept clearly applicable to all categories of Family Court proceedings. Additionally, this bill simplifies the time limit for Family Court judg- es to rule on objections filed regarding Support Magistrate determi- nations. Currently, the statute requires judges to rule on child support objections either within 15 days after submission of a rebuttal or, if none has been submitted, within 15 days after the expiration of the rebuttal period. In each case, the court must assess which time limit for ruling on objections is applicable. This bill eliminates this extra consideration by amending Family Court Act § 439(e) to provide that objections must be ruled upon within 35 days after the date the objection is filed, a predictable, consistent standard that would apply regardless of whether a rebuttal has been filed in a particular case. 6.

This is the sponsor's own case for the bill, quoted from their memorandum. It is not Agora's description of what the bill does.