Relates to orders of protection where the respondent is a minor who resides with a parent or other legally responsible person or other party

◆ The sponsor's argument

Why Jabari Brisport says this is needed

Among the greatest challenges facing families in New York State are cases in which parents or other persons legally responsible for a child under eighteen residing with them require assistance to stop alleged violence by the child against the parent, the child's sibling, or other members of the household. The juvenile respondent in such a case is in an adversarial relationship with the petitioning parent or other person and thus may lack an adult individual to act as a supportive guardian ad litem. Family offense proceedings under Article 8 of the Family Court Act are not geared for these types of cases and include jail as the only out-of-home placement possibility, which would not be lawful under either State or Federal law. Neither diversion to programs, nor the possibilities for foster placements either as temporary or dispositional options, are available, as they would be in Persons in Need of Super- vision (PINS) cases. Cf, Family Court Act §§ 720, 735, 739, 742 and 756. Moreover, neither the PINS, nor the family offense, statutes regarding orders of protection provide any protection against youth becoming home- less as a result of an order excluding them from their own homes. This measure would remedy each of these deficiencies. Homelessness among youth is a rapidly escalating problem that presents special challenges in light of the limited network of runaway and home- less youth shelter beds. For example, in the first six months of 2024 in New York City, "1,127 young people could not be placed in any youth beds," although none had declined available beds. See K. Homan, "Number of City Youth with Nowhere to Sleep at Night Climbs," The City, Sept. 16, 2024. By bringing PINS or family offense proceedings against their children, parents and guardians should not be permitted to add to this problem by excluding children, who are still dependent upon their parents or guardians, from their homes. Judges in family offense and PINS cases should thus ensure that alternatives to exclusion have been explored and should not issue stay-away orders in such cases if the effect would render the children homeless. Significantly, a family offense proceeding brought by parents or guardians against their chil- dren does not obviate the parents' or guardians' legal responsibility to support them until the age of 21, pursuant to Family Court Act § 413(1)(a). Additionally, the bill recognizes that the possibilities for diversion to appropriate programs, as well as for temporary foster care place- ments, both at the pre-dispositional and dispositional stages of a PINS proceeding, are vital in these types of cases and are far more appropri- ate than the limited alternatives available under the family offense provisions of the Family Court Act. The option to convert such a family offense case to a PINS and the requirement to do so if the action is brought against a child under the age of twelve, would provide essential tools for the Family Court to resolve the difficult family crises in front of them. In fact, noting that the remedy for violations of orders of protection in matters involving adult respondents, including, inter alia, commitment to jail, would "not be a viable alternative" in a case of a juvenile respondent, the Family Court, Ulster County, in PAULA S v. STEVEN S., 154 Misc. 2d 567 (Fam. Ct., Ulster Co., 1992), converted a family offense case into a PINS proceeding to afford a more appropriate range of dispositions. Further, for all family offense cases brought against youth under eigh- teen, the explicit authorization for the Family Court to appoint a guar- dian ad litem if the court deems it appropriate and to require the court to include a notice to the youth of that possibility is essential. In MATTER OF COHEN v. ESCOBAR, 219 A.D.3d 726 (2d Dept., 2023), leave to appeal denied; 40 N.Y.3d 908 (2023), the Appellate Division, Second Department held that a seventeen-year old youth, against whom a family offense was filed by his form

This is the sponsor's own case for the bill, quoted from their memorandum. It is not Agora's description of what the bill does.